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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-3685
________________
OKOCCI REMOI,
             Petitioner
     v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                  Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A72 748 741
on September 21, 2001
Immigration Judge: Alan L. Page
Initially Docketed as an Appeal from EDPA No. 03-cv-03360
Prior to the Enactment of the Real ID Act of 2005
_____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 21, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: May 3, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
    Remoi initiated these proceedings by filing a habeas corpus petition under 281
U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
the judicial district in which Remoi was in custody at the time he filed the petition. 
Following the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief, Remoi filed a timely notice
of appeal to this Court.  While his appeal was pending, the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L.
No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, took effect on May 11, 2005.  In light of the REAL ID Act, we
have determined that such pending appeals are converted to petitions for review under 8
U.S.C. § 1252.  See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because
the matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition, we decline to transfer it to the Second
Circuit, the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings. 
See id. at 446 n.5.  
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PER CURIAM
Okocci Remoi seeks review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition.1
Okocci Remoi is a native and citizen of Uganda.  Remoi was a student at Rutgers
University until he was expelled in 1990, based upon convictions for two counts of
criminal sexual contact in violation of N.J.S.A. § 2C:14-3(b) (criminal sexual contact in
the fourth degree) for which he received a sentence of time served (77 days) and three
years probation.   The Immigration and Naturalization Service began deportation
proceedings against him in 1994.   On September 21, 2001, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) issued a final order of removal against Remoi, finding that he had been
convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), and that a third 1995
conviction under the same New Jersey statute constituted an aggravated felony because it
was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (one Board member dissented). 
Supplemental Appendix (SA) at 000-014.   He then filed a petition for habeas corpus in
     In the meantime, the Government attempted to remove Remoi, but he passively2
resisted, and was eventually convicted of knowingly preventing and hampering his
departure, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(C).  He was sentenced to a term of 64
months imprisonment, followed by two years supervised release.  He appealed to this
Court, which affirmed the conviction but vacated and remanded for resentencing pursuant
to United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).  United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789
(3d Cir. 2005).  The District Court again sentenced Remoi to a term of 64 months
imprisonment.  Remoi’s appeal of the new sentence is pending in this Court at 05-4866.
     This Court denied his motion for a stay of removal on October 27, 2005.3
3
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York  challenging that
order.  The petition was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, as described previously.
The District Court dismissed the habeas petition on August 26, 2004 for lack of
jurisdiction.  SA 172-81.   The District Court held that the BIA had properly found that2
Remoi had been convicted of two CIMTs, and held that Remoi had not identified any
constitutional errors or errors of law in the BIA’s determination that he was ineligible for
withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture (CAT).  Remoi timely appealed, and we now treat the matter as a petition
for review.3
Although we are partially barred from reviewing a petition for review filed by an
alien removable for having committed certain criminal offenses; see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C); we nevertheless have jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and
questions of law raised by such a petition; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Singh v.
Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2006).  Thus, we may review Remoi’s legal claim
4that he did not commit an aggravated felony, his constitutional claim that his due process
rights were violated, and any legal claim or application of law to undisputed fact relating
to his application for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT.
As noted above, the BIA found that Remoi was removable because he had
committed two CIMTs, and also because he had committed an aggravated felony.  Remoi
does not appear to contest the finding that he committed two CIMTs, and we affirm the
BIA’s decision in that regard for the reasons stated by the BIA.  Remoi does contest,
however, the finding that he committed an aggravated felony.  The Government argues
that we need not reach the issue of whether Remoi committed an aggravated felony, and
that the question is “ultimately moot.” Appellee’s brief at 17, 24-25.  However, because
Remoi would be permanently barred from entering the United States if we uphold the
finding that he committed an aggravated felony, the question is not moot.  See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2005) (removed alien convicted of an aggravated felony who seeks
admission “at any time” is inadmissible); Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d
Cir. 2001).
We agree with the BIA that Remoi’s 1995 conviction is an aggravated felony
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), which provides that a crime is an aggravated
felony if it is:
      Pursuant to that section, “The term “crime of violence’ means--4
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16.
5
a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18,  but not including a4
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year. 
This Court has determined that courts should look at the term of imprisonment actually
imposed in order to determine whether a crime falls under this subsection.  See United
States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 1999) (interpreting identical “term of
imprisonment” language in § 1101(a)(43)(G) to mean term of imprisonment “imposed.”). 
Although Remoi was initially sentenced to 364 days imprisonment for this offense
(including 190 days served), SA 075, the BIA’s decision states that on September 25,
1996 Remoi was resentenced to incarceration for 18 months for failure to comply with
conditions of probation. SA 002, 077.  A sentence imposed after violation of probation is
viewed as a modification of the original sentence, and should thus be considered as the
term “imposed” for the conviction.  United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285
(2d Cir. 2002).  Thus, Remoi’s 1995 crime fits the definition in terms of the length of
     In his brief, Remoi alleges that after the 18 month sentence was imposed on5
September 25, 1996, his sentence was reduced on that same day to 280 days jail credit as
the term of imprisonment.  As noted above, our review does not extend to questions of
fact.  We therefore must accept the BIA’s finding that Remoi was sentenced to 18 months
imprisonment for this conviction.  It further appears that Remoi did not raise this issue
before the BIA and has thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the claim.
     In Remoi, we determined that Remoi’s earlier New Jersey convictions were “crimes6
of violence” as that term is defined in the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 
Remoi, 404 F.3d at 795.
6
incarceration.5
The question remains whether the crime was a crime of violence.  We agree with
the BIA that it was, pursuant to the definition of “crime of violence” found in § 16(b).  In
determining whether the crime falls under section 16(b), we use the categorical approach
of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 469 (3d
Cir. 2005).  Thus, we examine “the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction,
rather than . . . the particular facts relating to petitioner’s crime.”  Id. at 468 (quoting
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 6 (2004)).  However, where the statute is written in the
disjunctive, we may look to the charging instrument to determine which portion of the
statute was violated.  United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 2005).   6
   Remoi was convicted under N.J.S.A. § 2C:14-3b (1995). That statute, as it existed
in 1995, provided:
An actor is guilty of criminal sexual contact if he commits an act of sexual
contact with the victim under any of the circumstances set forth in section
2C:14-2c. (1) through (5).  Criminal sexual contact is a crime of the fourth degree.
The indictment shows that Remoi was charged with committing an act of sexual contact
     Section 2C:14-2c.(1) as it existed in 1995 provided that “The victim is one whom the7
actor knew or should have known was physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally
incapacitated.”; section (2) provided that “The actor uses physical force or coercion, but
the victim does not sustain severe personal injury.”  
7
with the victim “by using physical force or coercion and/or when [the victim] was one
whom Okocci Remoi knew or should have known was physically helpless . . . ., ” i.e., the
circumstances set forth at 2C:14-2c. (1) and (2).   SA 039.7
We find that Remoi’s conviction fits the definition of § 16(b), because it is (1) “a
felony” that (2) “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 
First, we look to state law to determine if the crime is categorized as a felony.  Francis v.
Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2001).  Although New Jersey does not categorize
crimes as “felonies,” but rather as crimes of the first, second, third and fourth degrees and
as disorderly conduct offenses; see N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:14-1 (1995); New Jersey has for
other purposes defined a “felony” as an offense punishable by more than a year in prison. 
See State v. Doyle, 200 A.2d 606, 614 (N.J. 1964) (so defining “felony” for purposes of
determining whether peace officer may make an arrest without a warrant); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39:3-10.11 (so defining “felony” for purposes of motor vehicle registration and
licensing laws).  As Remoi’s crime was punishable by a maximum of 18 months in
prison, see N.J.S.A. § 2C:43-6 (a)(4); it thus may be categorized as a felony.  
Second, we find that the crime involved “a substantial risk that physical force
8against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.”  In order to meet the crime of violence definition of section 16(b), there must be
a substantial risk that the actor will intentionally use force in the furtherance of the
offense.  Tran, 414 F.3d at 471 (emphasis in original).  Remoi was charged with either
“using physical force or coercion,” which by definition involves a substantial risk that
force will be used, or with sexual contact with a victim who was physically helpless. We
agree with other courts that have found in such circumstances that a sexual crime against
a physically helpless victim, unable to give consent, involves a substantial risk that
physical force will be used. Cf. Lisbey v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 930, 933 (9  Cir. 2005)th
(sexual touching against victim’s will and by restraint is crime of violence); Zaidi v.
Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357, 361 (5  Cir. 2004) (intentional sexual touching of another with ath
particular mental state and without consent is crime of violence); Sutherland v. Reno, 228
F.3d 171, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2000) (indecent assault and battery under Massachusetts law is
crime of violence; “the non-consent of the victim is the touchstone for determining”
whether a given offense involves substantial risk that physical force may be used in
commission of offense); see also Remoi, 404 F.3d at 795 (“penetration against a
‘physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally incapacitated’ victim . . . constitutes a
‘forcible sexual offense’” and is therefore a crime of violence for purposes of the
sentencing guidelines).  Remoi’s 1995 conviction is thus a crime of violence under §
     Given our holding, we need not reach the issue of whether Remoi’s 1995 conviction8
would be a crime of violence under § 16(a).
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16(b), and is therefore an aggravated felony.8
Because Remoi’s conviction is an aggravated felony, he is barred from applying
for asylum.  See Ilchuk v. Attorney General, 434 F.3d 613, 621 (3d Cir. 2006); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (asylum not available to alien who committed particularly serious
crime); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(I) (aggravated felony is particularly serious crime for
purposes of asylum statute). 
Commission of a “particularly serious crime” also precludes eligibility for
withholding of removal under the statute and the CAT.  In the context of withholding of
removal:
an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for
which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of
at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious
crime. The previous sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General from
determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien
has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).  The BIA found that, despite his sentence to time served (77
days) and three years of probation, the second offense under Remoi’s first (1990)
conviction was a particularly serious crime because Remoi touched the victim in a sexual
manner without her consent.  SA 004.
To the extent the BIA’s determination was discretionary, we lack jurisdiction to
review it.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999, 1002 (9  Cir.th
10
2001).  Remoi argues that he is not challenging the discretionary determination that his
crime was “particularly serious,” but instead raises a due process violation.  However,
Remoi was given an opportunity before the IJ to challenge the designation of his crime as
“particularly serious.”  On appeal, the BIA looked at the particular facts of Remoi’s case
in making an individualized determination that his crime was particularly serious.  “Due
process requires no more.”  Chong v. District Director, 264 F.3d 378, 387 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding no due process violation in similar circumstances).  We therefore must uphold
the BIA’s determination that Remoi committed a particularly serious crime.
Despite his conviction for an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime,
Remoi would remain eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT if he could show that
it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if returned to Uganda.  8 C.F.R. § 208.17. 
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, noting that Remoi had omitted
several key elements of his testimony from his application and affidavit in support of his
CAT claim.  As “credibility determinations are factual matters,” see Jishiashvili v.
Attorney General, 402 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2005), and because Remoi is a “criminal
alien,” we may not review the determination.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
Again, Remoi attempts to challenge the adverse credibility finding by framing the
issue as a due process violation.  Remoi appears to make two arguments.  First, he argues
that the BIA misapplied 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b), which provides, inter alia, that an alien
who has a request for relief under the CAT pending on March 22, 1999 need not
     Remoi sought asylum and related relief based on persecution on account of his9
ethnicity.
     The Government also notes that there is no evidence in the record that Remoi10
actually sought to introduce this recorded testimony.
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demonstrate that the evidence sought to be offered in support of that claim was
unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at a prior hearing.  Remoi
argues that because the BIA faulted him for not providing details of his claim in his
original application for asylum and withholding, it violated this regulation.  However, the
BIA did not reject his testimony in support of his CAT claim on the grounds that he did
not show that the details he presented were previously unavailable; rather, it found his
testimony incredible because it was not reasonable to believe that he would leave
compelling, graphic details out of his original application.
Remoi’s second argument is that to the extent the adverse credibility finding rested
on failure to corroborate his claim, the IJ violated his due process rights by not allowing
him to introduce the recorded testimony of a particular Ugandan exile.  However, as the
Government notes, the IJ did accept into evidence an affidavit from this same person, but
gave it no weight, as the exile was not of the same ethnicity as Remoi,  and because the9
exile was granted asylum based on his political activities and not his ethnicity.   Further,10
we note that Remoi declined the IJ’s offer of additional time to gather and submit
additional evidence about conditions in Uganda.  App. A-006.  We find no violation of
Remoi’s due process rights.
12
Because Remoi did not produce credible testimony and evidence supporting his
claim for protection under the CAT, the BIA properly denied deferral of removal.  For the
foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
